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THE ABSURDITY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE LAW
EXPOSED: SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS
PUNISHMENT OF INNOCENT IN BENNIS V.




Imagine that your teenage son borrows the family car to go to the
mall. The next thing you know, a police officer calls to inform you
that your son has been picked up for shoplifting. Now imagine that
the officer then informs you that your car is going to be forfeited to
the state because it was an instrument in the crime. If you do not
think it can happen, think again.' Even if the charges against your son
are dropped, you can still lose your car. This is because civil forfeiture
is a proceeding against your car, not your son, so his guilt or innocence
is irrelevant. 2
It is conceivable that some may justify such a situation by arguing
that a parent should be responsible for his or her child's actions be-
cause it was the parent's decision to entrust the car to the child. But
can the same rationalization be used between spouses? Should you be
held responsible for the actions of another adult, over whom you have
no control, who has equal ownership rights to the car in question? A
majority of the United States Supreme Court apparently thinks so.
In Bennis v. Michigan,3 a state nuisance statute was used to abate a
husband and wife's co-owned car after the husband committed a mis-
1. Jacqueline Saravion, a New Jersey resident, lost her 1987 Oldsmobile after police said her
son drove it to a local Sears, where he allegedly shoplifted a pair of pants. Daniel Hay, Highway
Robbery, WORLD PRss REv., June 1996, at 28.
2. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926) (upholding the forfeiture of a car when
the alleged wrongdoer is acquitted of the charges). For a more detailed discussion of Van Oster,
see infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text. In fact, in more than 80% of asset forfeiture cases,
the property owner is not charged with a crime, yet the government often keeps the seized
property. Civil Asset Forfeiture: Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Terrance G. Reed, on behalf of the American Bar Associa-
tion, citing George Fishman, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: The Agenda Before Congress, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 121, 129 (1994)).
3. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
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demeanor while using it.4 Mrs. Bennis thought that if her car was go-
ing to be taken from her, she at least deserved reimbursement for her
share of the automobile's value.5 However, the state statute did not
provide for an "innocent owner defense" and her request was denied.6
She therefore challenged the constitutionality of the statute.
In March of 1996, the Supreme Court, by reviewing the Bennis v.
Michigan case, decided for the first time whether a state statute's fail-
ure to provide an innocent owner defense in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing7 was unconstitutional. 8 The Court, in a five-to-four opinion
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that such an omission did not
violate any of the innocent owner's constitutional rights. 9 For Tina
Bennis, the majority's opinion meant that although she was not guilty
of any wrongdoing, and in fact was never accused of wrongdoing, she
had lost her car, lost any chance of getting reimbursed for her share of
the car's value, and lost her faith in a Constitution which supposedly
protects its citizens from losing "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."1 0
This Note addresses the current status of civil forfeiture law by ex-
amining the Bennis v. Michigan decision and its implications for inno-
cent owners under current law. Part I explores the history of civil
forfeiture, beginning with English common law." Both early and re-
cent American case law follows, highlighting some of the precedent
used by the Court in the Bennis case, and some of the precedent the
Court chose to ignore.12 Part II reviews the Bennis decision in detail,
explaining the basis of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opin-
ions. Part III analyzes the Court's choice of precedent, the Court's
4. Id.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
7. Forfeiture is defined as the "loss of some right or property as a penalty for some illegal act."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990). In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the government
can confiscate property without proving the owner's guilt or even charging the owner with a
wrongdoing; the only requirement is that the government show probable cause for the forfeiture.
See REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE, FORFEITING OUR PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1995); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, CIVIL FORFEITURE: TRACING THE PROCEEDS OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICK-
ING 1-2 (1988). The owner then has the burden of showing why his property should be returned.
HYDE, supra, at 26; BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra, at 2.
8. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997-98.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
11. Although civil forfeiture can be traced further back in history, doing so would go beyond
the scope of this Note. For more historical background, see LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO
STEAL 7-20 (1996); James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at
Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 770-92 (1977).
12. See infra Part I.B.-C.
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failure to apply any of the standards that have been set forth in prior
case law, the Court's continued use of the personification fiction, 13
and whether the forfeiture in the Bennis case can be categorized as
remedial or punitive. Part IV discusses the impact the Bennis decision
may have on the state of innocent owner defenses in civil forfeiture
law, including the impact this decision may have on third-party credi-
tors as well as consumers of credit. Finally, Part V concludes by criti-
cizing the Court's misplaced use of outdated precedent and suggests
that Congress must now take the initiative to create legislation that
will revamp civil forfeiture law as it currently stands.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current forfeiture laws and their pur-
poses, it is important to start in England, at the root of American for-
feiture law.14 This Part begins with a brief historical look at English
Common Law regarding civil forfeiture.15 An exploration of
America's adoption of England's forfeiture law in the nineteenth cen-
tury follows.16 Due to the diversity of twentieth-century forfeiture
laws, the law will be explored by separating the cases that have relied
on statutes with innocent owner defenses from those cases that have
not.17 Finally, this Part explores the recent Supreme Court decision of
Austin v. United States,'8 which the Bennis dissent relied on, and
which the majority concluded was irrelevant to the issue.19
A. Civil forfeiture in England
The issue of innocent owners' rights in property dates back to at
least the fourteenth century.20 The British Crown sought to impose
vicarious liability upon-property owners in forfeiture proceedings "be-
cause [it was] the principle means of tax enforcement. ' '21 These in
13. Personification is the rationale courts have traditionally used to justify civil forfeiture as
an act against the property, for the property's wrong. See Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How
the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
911, 918-19 (1991). This concept is discussed throughout the case law reviewed in the back-
ground section.
14. See LEVY, supra note 11, at 39-40.
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.C.1.-2.
18. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
19. See infra Part I.C.3.
20. See Maxeiner, supra note 11, at 773.
21. Id.
1998]
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rem22 proceedings were hindered, however, by legislation concerned
with innocent property owners. In 1353, the Statute of Staples pro-
vided an innocent owner defense,2 3 and ten years later, an innocent
owner provision protecting ship owners in customs proceedings was
created.2 4
The complete disregard of innocent owners appeared again in Brit-
ish law three centuries later with the enactment of the British Naviga-
tion Acts.25 The Acts, passed during England's expansion as a
maritime power, required imports and exports to be carried on British
ships, and if violated, authorized the ships' forfeiture to the Crown,
regardless of the owners' innocence.2 6 However, although the Acts
were worded in absolute terms, juries acquitted shipowners if it could
not be shown that the owner would have discovered the illegality after
a reasonable search.2 7 Furthermore, after the Navigation Acts, in
22. In rem is defined as "[a] technical term used to designate proceedings or actions instituted
against the thing .... BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990).
23. Mitchell v. Torup, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766) (quoting Statute of Staples, 1353, 27 Edw.
3, ch. 19, reprinted in 1 Stat. at Large 281). The Statute of Staples, provided:
No merchant or other, of what condition that he may be, shall lose or forfeit his goods
or merchandizes, for trespass & forfeiture of his servant; unless he do [sic] it by the
commandment or procurement of his master, or that he shall have offended in the
office in which his master hath set him, or in other manner that the master be holden to
answer for the deed of his servant by the law merchant, as elsewhere is used.
Id.
24. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Ben-
nis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). This statute provided:
Whereas the Ships and diverse People of the Realm by arrested and holden forfeit,
because of a little Thing put in their Ship not customed, whereof the Owners of the
same Ships be ignorant; it is accorded and assented, That no Owner shall lose his ship
from the fifteenth day of February next coming forth, for such a small Thing put within
the Ship not customed, without this Knowledge.
37 Edw. 3, ch. 8, reprinted in 1 Stat. at Large 319 (1363).
25. The Navigation Act, 1660, 12 Car. 2. ch. 18, reprinted in 1 Stat. at Large 182. The Naviga-
tion Act at issue, entitled "An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Naviga-
tion" stated:
[N]o goods or Commodities whatsoever shall be imported into or exported out of any
Lands, Islands, Plantations or Territories of his Majesty ... in any [foreign] ship ...
whatsoever, but in such Ships or Vessels as do truly and without Fraud belong only to
the People of England ... [and] under the Penalty of the Forfeiture and Loss of all the
Goods and Commodities which shall be imported into or exported out of any the afore-
said Places in any other Ship ... his Majesty ... [is] hereby authorized and strictly
required to seize and bring in as Prize all such Ships or Vessels as shall have offended
contrary hereunto, and deliver them to the Court of Admiralty, there to be proceeded
against.
Id.
26. Maxiener, supra note 11, at 774.
27. Id. at 775. For example, although the Court in Mitchell, upheld the forfeiture of a ship
under the British Navigation Acts when the jury found no "knowledge, privity or consent of the
master, mate or owners," the Court suggested that the jury "neither would nor ought ... find a
670
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1692 the Fourth of William and Mary Parliament enacted a statute
entitled, An Act for Encouraging the Apprehending of Highway-
men.28 This statute, by allowing a person who apprehended a robber
to keep the robber's property unless it had wrongfully been taken
from its rightful owner,29 demonstrated that when protection of cus-
toms revenues was not at issue, respect for property rights was still
intact.
B. Nineteenth-Century Civil Forfeiture in America
Early American forfeiture statutes can be traced back to the British
Navigation Acts.30 However, the United States adoption of British
forfeiture laws was a highly unpopular concept because of the belief
that the British Crown had widely abused forfeiture laws "in its at-
tempt to tax, control, and punish American colonists. ' 31 The ten-
dency of early American decisions to follow the English route was
merely an expression of economic necessity during the nation's first
century-the first United States Congress passed forfeiture statutes to
aid in the collection of customs duties, a major source of revenue dur-
ing the nineteenth century. 32
In 1827, America's forfeiture power was challenged and upheld by
the Supreme Court in The Palmyra.33 In that case, the forfeited ves-
forfeiture" in cases where the quantity of contraband was very small. Mitchell, 145 Eng. Rep. at
765, 767.
28. An Act Encouraging the Apprehending of Highwaymen, 4 W. & M., 1692, ch. 8, reprinted
in 1 Stat. at Large 517. Section 6 of the statute provided:
[Such a person] shall have and enjoy to his . . . proper Use and Behoof the Horse,
Furniture, and Arms, Money, or other Goods of the said Robber... Provided always,
That this Clause ... shall not be construed to extend to take away the Right of any
Person or Persons to such Horses, Furniture, and Arms, Money, or other Goods, from
whom the same were before feloniously taken.
Id.
29. Id.
30. See Arthur W. Leach & John G. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An Appropriate Solution to
the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 247-48 n.25 (1994) (discussing several
sources of modem forfeiture laws); Maxiener, supra note 11, at 777 (explaining that while the
colonies had to adhere to the Navigation Acts, there were significant variances among the
colonies).
31. HYDE, supra note 7, at 20. In fact, one of the earliest cases of colonial rebellion came
when the Crown seized John Hancock's schooner Liberty after he refused to pay the unpopular
tax on its cargo of Madiera wine. Id. His attorney, John Adams's, defense-that "property is
surely a right of mankind as real as liberty"-was used by pamphleteers of the American
Revolution. Id.
32. Leach & Malcolm, supra note 30, at 249.
33. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827). Note that before the Supreme Court discarded the interests
of innocent owners in cases of admiralty, the Court did look at an owner's innocence. See Peisch
v. Ware, 8 U.S. (1 Cranch) 347 (1808). In Peisch, Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of a
unanimous court, and held that goods removed from the custody of revenue officers without
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sel was armed, cruising as a privateer, and under commission from the
King of Spain when it was captured on the high seas for piracy.34 The
appellees contended that the suit could not be maintained because the
offenders were not alleged to have been convicted in personam.35 Jus-
tice Story, writing for the majority, stated that to require a conviction
in personam has never "applied to seizures and forfeitures, created by
statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer. The
thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the of-
fence [sic] is attached primarily to the thing."'36 Justice Story ex-
plained that if such a conviction were required, "there could never be
a judgment of condemnation pronounced against any vessel [involved
in piracy]; for there is no act of Congress which provides for the per-
sonal punishment of [the] offenders. '37
The Court again looked at the issue of an owner's innocence in an
1844 case, Harmony v. United States,38 when a vessel was seized for
piracy.39 Using The Palmyra as precedent, the Court held that "[t]he
vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender . . .
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner."'40  The Court explained that disregarding the owner's inno-
cence "is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate
means of suppressing the offence [sic] or wrong, or insuring an indem-
nity to the injured party."'4 1
Although the early admiralty decisions supported forfeitures with
equitable or remedial principles, the United States government radi-
payment of duties should not be forfeitable for that reason unless they were removed with the
consent of the owner or his agent-giving weight to the innocence of the owner in the forfeiture
decision. Id. at 364. The Court went on to state that "if... without any fault on his part, his
property should be invaded, the law cannot be understood to punish him with the forfeiture of
that property," Id.
34. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 1.
35. Id. at 12. In personam literally means "against the person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
791 (6th ed. 1990). In personam jurisdiction is the "[plower which a court has over the defend-
ant himself ... [a] court which lacks personal jurisdiction is without power to issue an in per-
sonam judgment." Id.
36. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. This concept of treating the object as the offender is known as
the personification fiction. See supra note 13.
37. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15. Justice Story did not elaborate, however, on the personifica-
tion fiction or discuss the appropriateness of conducting a forfeiture proceeding in rem other
than in Admiralty and English Common Law Courts. See Maxeiner, supra note 11, at 781-82.
38. 43 U.S. (1 How.) 210 (1844).
39. Id. at 210-11.
40. Id. at 233.
41. Id. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. agreed that "[t]he ship is the only security available in
dealing with foreigners, and rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy abroad in
strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy the claim at home." See HYDE, supra note
7, at 22 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 26 (1881)).
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cally changed the law of forfeiture during the Civil War, proceeding in
rem for purely punitive reasons. 42 Forfeiture was put into practice in
an effort to "seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dis-
pose of it at the will of the captor" through the Confiscation Act of
1862.43 Opponents argued that it would be unconstitutional to take
property without compensation and to punish a citizen without a
trial.44 The Act narrowly passed and was challenged thereafter in the
courts as the states began to implement the law.45 Three cases chal-
lenging the law reached the Supreme Court.46 However, the Supreme
Court upheld the law, not on due process grounds, but as one com-
mentator noted, "because it was a war powers exercise aimed at ene-
mies of the Union."47
Disregard for the status of the owner in forfeiture proceedings was
broadly extended in 1877 when the Court ruled on Dobbins's Distil-
lery v. United States. 48 In that case, a distillery was seized when the
lessee of the property, the operator of the distillery, was charged with
tax fraud. 49 The owner of the distillery proclaimed innocence, but the
Court, using the same justification for forfeiture as in The Palmyra,50
held that the wrongdoer was the distillery and, therefore, the owner's
innocence was irrelevant.51 The Court explained that "property of the
owner is [often] forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or miscon-
duct of those entrusted with its possession. 52 Returning to the logic of
admiralty decisions, the Court stated that, "acts of the master and
crew bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be inno-
42. See LEvY, supra note at 11, at 51-52.
43. HYDE, supra note 7, at 22 (citing Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305
(1870)).
44. See LEvY, supra note 11, at 53-54.
45. Maxeiner, supra note 11, at 787 (discussing the events leading up to the Supreme Court
cases that challenged the constitutionality of the Confiscation Act of 1862).
46. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1870); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
268 (1870); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1870).
47. See Maxiener, supra note 11, at 787. Henry Hyde has noted that this rationale may ex-
plain the government's willingness to let forfeiture play such a large role today in the war on
drugs. HYDE, supra note 7, at 23.
48. 96 U.S. 395 (1877); see Maxiener, supra note 11, at 791 n.133 (discussing Dobbins's Distil-
lery in the context of a lessor's vicarious liability).
49. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 395.
50. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); see supra notes 33-37 and accompanying
text.
51. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
52. Id. (emphasis added). Note that the language "entrusted with its possession" is the basis
of the negligent entrustment standard articulated in Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926),
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), and Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993), which justified forfeiture of innocent owners' property based on their own negli-
gence. See infra notes 67-83, and 112-22 and accompanying text.
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cent or guilty, and that in sending the ship to sea under their charge he
impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture. '53
C. Twentieth-Century Civil Forfeiture
Unlike their common law predecessors, twentieth-century civil for-
feitures have been part of larger governmental efforts to eliminate un-
desirable social behavior, such as alcohol and drug use. 54 Forfeiture
cases in this century have produced a wide variety of inconsistent re-
sults: some states have used statutes that do not provide for an inno-
cent owner defense,55 and federal courts have relied on many statutes
that do provide for innocent owner defenses,56 leaving factually simi-
lar situations treated quite differently.
1. The Irrelevance of Innocence
In early twentieth-century cases,57 as well as more recent deci-
sions,58 the Court has continued to personify property of alleged
wrongdoers to justify forfeiture. In fact, Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
United States, 59 decided in 1921, is often cited by courts that justify the
forfeiture of innocent owners' property.60 In that case, a car dealer-
ship challenged the constitutionality of a statute that imposed forfei-
ture regardless of an owner's innocence. 61 The dealer had sold the car
to the persons responsible for using the car illegally (transporting li-
quor to evade taxes), but had retained the title for unpaid purchase
money.62 At trial, the "jury found the car guilty. ' 63 The Court upheld
the verdict, stating that "the thing is primarily considered the of-
fender. '64 Although the Court acknowledged that the section of the
statute which provided for forfeiture regardless of an owner's guilt
53. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
54. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the Institute for Justice n.4, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994
(1996) (No. 94-8729). New Jersey has one of the most severe forfeiture laws, which is triggered
by any alleged criminal conduct, even shoplifting. HYDE, supra note 7, at 24.
55. See infra Part I.C.1.
56. See infra Part I.C.2.
57. See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
59. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
60. As noted by one commentator: "From 1921 to the present, the law of forfeiture has fol-
lowed the interpretation of Goldsmith-Grant." Maxiener, supra note 11, at 792.
61. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 509-10.
62. Id. at 509. The dealership's interest, as a third-party creditor, is representative of the con-
cerns voiced by the American Bankers Association in their Amicus Curiae Brief submitted on
behalf of Tina Bennis. See infra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
63. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S at 509. The quote exemplifies the personification of objects
used to justify forfeiture when the owner's guilt is questionable.
64. Id. at 511.
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"seem[ed] to violate that justice which should be the foundation of the
due process of law required by the Constitution,"65 it went on to state
that "[in breaches of revenue provisions some forms of property are
facilities, and therefore ... Congress ... ascrib[es] to the property a
certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong. '66
Similarly, in Van Oster v. Kansas,67 decided five years later, an inno-
cent owner's car was forfeited.68 The car's owner lent the car to the
car dealership owner for his use, and the dealership owner's agent,
while in the car, was arrested for illegal transport of liquor. 69
Although the agent was acquitted of the charges, the Kansas Supreme
Court upheld the forfeiture of the car.70 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Kansas Supreme Court decision and, using the rev-
enue line of cases as a basis for upholding the forfeiture,71 explained
that an owner who entrusts another with his vehicle subjects himself
to responsibility for the entrusted's acts.72 The Court was not dis-
turbed by the agent's acquittal, stating only that the decision of the
state court was controlling. 73
As recently as 1974, the Supreme Court endorsed the personifica-
tion fiction for forfeiture. 74 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 75 a leased yacht became the subject of forfeiture when one mari-
juana cigarette was found on board.76 The Supreme Court stated that,
65. Id. at 510.
66. Id. The Court added that such reasoning "is too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to now be displaced." Id. at 511. Interestingly, although this deci-
sion is widely cited as justification for civil forfeiture of innocent owners' property, had this
decision been reached 11 months later, it may have produced a different outcome. The forfei-
ture proceeding in Goldsmith-Grant, under § 3450 of the Revised Statutes, reached a decision on
Jan. 17, 1921. Id. at 505. On November 23, 1921, the Willis-Campbell Act was passed, which
stated that, "all laws relating to taxation and traffic in liquors ... in force when the [National
Prohibition Act] was adopted, were continued in force except... [where] directly in conflict with
the NPA." Willis-Campbell Act, ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1921). The National Prohibition Act
("NPA"), which was in effect when Goldsmith-Grant was decided, provided an innocent owner
defense. 27 U.S.C. § 40 (1919) (repealed 1935); see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
67. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
68. Id. at 466.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 468. The Court cited Goldsmith-Grant and Dobbins's Distillery as support. Id.
72. Id. at 467. The Court reasoned that this logic extends beyond forfeiture proceedings,
pointing out that an automobile owner is liable for the negligent operation of those entrusted
with its use. Id.
73. Id. at 469. The court stated that the acquittal "at most involved questions of state proce-
dure." Id.
74. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-88 (1974) (upholding a
Puerto Rican statute providing for forfeiture of vessels used for unlawful purposes).
75. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
76. HYDE, supra note 7, at 71.
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"the innocence of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has al-
most uniformly been rejected as a defense, ' 77 and held that regardless
of the owner's innocence, the yacht was the offender and, therefore,
was properly forfeited.78 The Court stated that, "[t]o the extent that
such forfeiture provisions are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured
creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing, confiscation may have
the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in trans-
ferring possession of their property. '79
Although the Puerto Rican statute at issue in Calero-Toledo did not
explicitly provide an innocent owner defense, it was modeled after
The Controlled Substances Act, which provides an innocent owner de-
fense in the enforcement of forfeiture proceedings. 80 Puerto Rican
courts had previously recognized the same exceptions as the federal
statute-namely, that when the owner's property was taken from an
individual without privity or consent, the unbending rule might not
apply. 81 In what later became known as the "reasonable steps test,"
the Court explained, "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional
claim of an owner.., who proved not only that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all
that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property. ' 82 In such a circumstance, the Court added, "it would be
77. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 (discussing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827), a
piracy case, as an example).
78. Id. at 687-88.
79. Id. Such logic was recently revisited. Although the owners of a three unit apartment
building knew of drug activity on the property, they were fearful of getting involved and left law
enforcement up to the police. Ron Galperin, Landlords vs. Drug Dealers, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12,
1992, at K1. The building was seized and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the owners
were guilty of "willful dereliction of social responsibility." Id.
80. The Controlled Substances Act provides:
(B) No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by reason of
any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omit-
ted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the
possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or of any State.
(C) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest
of an owner, by reason of any act of omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner.
21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4) (1994).
81. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689.
82. Id. (emphasis added). This "reasonable steps" test has been adhered to in a number of
cases where innocent owners protested the forfeitures at issue. United States v. One 1982 28'
International Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. One Tintoretto, 691
F.2d 603, 607 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d 1386, 1388
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1983 Homemade Vessel Named Barracuda, 625 F. Supp.
893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1986). Although each of these cases was prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. §881(a),
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difficult to conclude that the forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive. 83
2. The Creation of Innocent Owner Defenses
Various federal laws which were passed in the twentieth century im-
plemented innocent owner defenses when subjecting property to for-
feiture. The National Prohibition Act ("NPA"), for example, created
to punish the illegal transport and consumption of liquor, imple-
mented an innocent owner defense. 84 In the 1930 case of Richbourg
Motor Co. v. United States,8 5 a person discovered in the act of unlaw-
fully transporting liquor was arrested and the automobile he was driv-
ing was seized under section 26 of the NPA. 86 Since the car's owner
was not the driver, the government sought to proceed with the forfei-
ture under a different statute in order to avoid the innocent owner
defense of the NPA.8 7 The owner of the vehicle, who was a lienor
under a conditional sales contract with a person other than the ar-
rested driver, protested prosecution under that statute since the origi-
nal seizure was authorized under the NPA. 88 The Supreme Court held
that the forfeiture must proceed under the NPA because under the
Willis-Campbell Act of 1921, any law, or section of law, relating to the
illegal transportation of liquor that was in direct conflict with the NPA
must be superseded by that Act.89 The Court determined that Con-
which provides for an innocent owner defense, the courts in each case cited Calero-Toledo as
support for "the reasonable steps" test. One 1982 28' International Vessel, 741 F.2d at 1322; One
Tintoretto, 691 F.2d at 607; One 1972 Chevrolet Blazer, 563 F.2d at 1388; One 1983 Homemade
Vessel Named Barracuda, 625 F. Supp. at 899.
83. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90.
84. The National Prohibition Act provided:
Whenever intoxicating liquors transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an
officer he shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile .... and upon
conviction of the person so arrested shall order the liquor destroyed, and unless good
cause to the contrary is shown by the owner, shall order a sale by public auction of the
property seized, and the officer ... shall pay all liens .... which are established .... as
being bonafide and as having been created without the liener having any notice that the
carrying vehicle was being used or was to be used for illegal transportation of liquor.
27 U.S.C. § 40 (1919) (repealed 1935).
85. 281 U.S. 528 (1930).
86. Id. at 531, 536. The petitioners intervened in the district court to assert their interests in
the vehicle as innocent lienors. Id. at 530-31. This was actually a consolidated case of two simi-
lar factual situations. Id. Note that this is another example of the government continuing to
pursue the automobile's forfeiture after the charges against the driver were dropped. Id. at 531.
87. Id. The government sought enforcement of forfeiture under section 3450 of the Revised
Statutes, which stated only that "every vessel, boat, cart, carriage, or other conveyance whatso-
ever ... shall be forfeited." Id. n.2. The district court forfeited the vehicles and the court of
appeals affirmed. Id. at 530.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 532. Section 5 of the Willis-Campbell Act of Nov. 23, 1921 provided:
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gress intended to protect innocent owners because the Act potentially
would increase the seizure of vehicles and, therefore, prosecution
would have to be attempted under the NPA. 90
Nine years later, in United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8
Deluxe Coach,91 an individual was similarly arrested and the car he
was driving was forfeited for violation of the internal revenue laws
relating to liquor. 92 Under the Act in question, an owner's innocence
was also a defense. 93 The owner, a credit company, established this
defense by showing that: 1) it was the owner, 2) it made a good faith
purchase, and 3) it had no knowledge or reason to know that the car
would be used to violate the law.94 The Court affirmed the lower
courts' rulings for the remission of forfeiture,95 explaining that "forfei-
ture acts are exceedingly drastic... [and] were intended for [the] pro-
tection of the revenues, not to punish without fault, '96 and "should be
enforced only when within both [the] letter and spirit of the law."'97
Innocent owner defenses have also been employed in the fight
against drugs through the Controlled Substances Act.98 In several
[A]II laws in regard to the manufacture and taxation of and traffic in intoxicating liquor
and all penalties for violations of such laws that were in force when the National Prohi-
bition Act was enacted, shall be and continue in force ... except such provisions ... as
are directly in conflict with any provision of the National Prohibition Act.
Willis-Campbell Act, ch. 134, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1921).
90. Richbourg Motor Co., 281 U.S. at 535-37.
91. 307 U.S. 219 (1939).
92. Id. at 221. In this case an automobile finance company that purchased in good faith a
conditional sales contract covering the sale of an automobile from a dealer believed that the
vendor named therein was the real purchaser and owner of the vehicle. Id. at 222. In reality, the
vendor named was the brother of the actual car owner. Id.
93. Id. at 221. The defendant was prosecuted under the Liquor Law Repeal & Enforcement
Act of Aug. 27, 1935, 27 U.S.C. § 40a (repealed 1948). One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach,
307 U.S. at 220-21.
Sec. 204 (b) In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the claim of any claimant
for remission or mitigation unless and until he proves (1) that he has an interest in such
vehicle or aircraft ... which he acquired in good faith, (2) that he had at no time any
knowledge or reason to believe that it was being or would be used in the violation of
laws of the United States or any State relating to liquor ....
Id.
94. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at 223. Because the claimant's innocent
owner defense was based on his status as a lienor, a fourth element was required by the Act;
namely a showing that an inquiry was made of law enforcement officers in the locality about the
record or reputation of the 'owner' of the vehicle. 27 U.S.C. § 40a; One 1936 Model Ford V-8
Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at 223. The claimant fulfilled this requirement, and was told upon in-
quiry, that the owner had no record. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at 223.
95. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 Deluxe Coach, 307 U.S. at 238.
96. Id. at 236. The Court noted that if any claimant has been negligent or in good conscience
ought not be relieved, courts should deny the claim. Id. at 226.
97. Id. (citing Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33-35 (1875)).
98. The Controlled Substances Act provides:
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cases seeking forfeiture under this Act, half-owners of property have
succeeded in using their innocence as a defense. For example, in
United States v. One 1981 Datsun 280ZX, 99 a father and daughter co-
owned a car in which the daughter was arrested for buying drugs.1°°
Although the car was forfeited, the father succeeded in establishing an
innocent owner defense and regained the car.10 1 The court reasoned
that the predominance of the evidence supported his contention that
he had nothing to do with the purchase of the drugs and that he
neither knew or had reason to know of any illegal drug transaction. 02
The court also added that a family situation where a father reasonably
thought he knew his daughter was totally different from a commercial
situation where a lessor is obligated to investigate its lessee.10 3 There-
fore, the court held that the father did all that he reasonably could
have done to prevent illegal use of the automobile.' °4
A similar co-owner situation occurred in both United States v. One
Parcel of Real Property'0 5 and Devito v. United States.'06 In One Par-
cel of Real Property, a husband and wife co-owned a house that was
forfeited in a drug raid.10 7 The wife claimed to be an innocent
owner.10 8 The court found that she sufficiently proved co-ownership
and ignorance of her husband's drug activity, and granted her a fifty-
(B) No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of the action by reason of
any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omit-
ted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance was unlawfully in the
possession of the person other than the owner in violation of the criminal laws of the
United States, or of any State.
(C) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of an interest
of an owner, by reason of any act of omission established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner.
21 U.S.C. §881(a)(4) (1994). Many commentators find fault with this innocent owner defense for
placing the burden on the owners to prove their innocence. See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture:
Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of David B. Smith, on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers).
99. 644 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
100. Id. at 1281-83. The F.B.I. stopped the daughter while driving the car and found approxi-
mately 103 grams of methamphetamine. Id. at 1283.
101. Id. at 1288.
102. Id. at 1287.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1288 (emphasis added). The court specifically pointed to the father's numerous
attempts after his daughter's arrest to contact her and find the car. Id.
105. 942 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1991).
106. 520 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
107. One Parcel of Real Property, 942 F.2d at 76. During the raid, heroine and $19,325 in cash
were found in a microwave oven. Id.
108. Id. at 79. Although only the husband's name was on the title to the house, the wife
convinced the court that an oral agreement between her and her husband providing that she
would pay the mortgage created a resulting trust. Id.
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percent interest in the property. 0 9 In Devito, a husband and wife's
car was forfeited after the husband allegedly made an illegal drug
transaction in the car.110 The wife claimed to be an innocent owner,
and the court, citing Calero-Toledo as authority, held that the wife
should be given the opportunity to prove "that she did all that she
reasonably could have been expected to do to prevent the illegal use of
her automobile" and, therefore, denied the government's motion for
summary judgment."' As these cases demonstrate, concern for an
owner's innocence has not been completely disregarded in all civil for-
feiture precedent.
3. Forfeiture and Innocent Owners Under the Contemporary
Supreme Court
In 1993, in Austin v. United States," 2 the Supreme Court did not
consider whether an innocent owner was entitled to protection, but
instead whether the forfeiture at issue was a violation of the Excessive
Fines Clause of the United States Constitution."13 Therefore, in Aus-
tin, the Court needed to first determine whether civil forfeiture could
be considered punishment." 4 In Austin, the State sought forfeiture of
a mobile home and auto body shop where the defendant had partaken
in a drug deal.115 By exploring the history of forfeiture and its pur-
pose, the Court held that the forfeiture could be violative of the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause."16 Concluding that forfeiture is and has had a
109. Id. at 80.
110. Devito, 520 F. Supp. at 128.
111. Id. at 130 (emphasis added) (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663 (1974)). No subsequent history is available; presumably, the government did not pur-
sue the forfeiture further. Note too that not all co-owners challenging forfeiture under this stat-
ute are as successful as the co-owners just discussed. In One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. United
States, 783 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1986), a mother challenged the forfeiture of her car due to her son's
alleged drug activity, claiming that she was an "innocent owner." Id. at 761. Although the son
was acquitted of all charges, the court said that the proceedings were unrelated and nothing in
the record demonstrated a lack of consent to the son's use of the car or an attempt to prevent
him from using the car for drug related purposes. Id. at 762. As one can see, even under the
statutes with innocent owner defenses, courts do not uniformly apply the law and some innocent
owners still lose their property.
112. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
113. Id. at 604.
114. The Court reasoned that because the Excessive Fines Clause of the Constitution is pri-
marily concerned with excess punishment, it could only be applied to a civil forfeiture case if civil
forfeiture serves at least in part to punish. Id. at 610.
115. Id. at 604. Richard Austin pleaded guilty to possessing two grams of cocaine (worth
about $2,000) with intent to distribute. Id. He received seven years in prison. Id. After decid-
ing that forfeiture of his home and auto body shop could be found violative of the Excessive
Fines Clause, the Court remanded the case back to the lower courts. Id. at 623.
116. Id. at 611-23.
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history of being, at least in part, punitive in nature, 117 the Court then
looked to the history of the innocent owner defense as proof of a leg-
islative intent not to punish the innocent. 118 The Court further found
that although the United States has a long history of disregarding the
innocent in forfeiture cases, the decisions were based either on the
idea that the property itself was considered guilty, or that the owner
was accountable for the wrongs of the entrusted, for being negligent in
choice or practice of entrusting. 1 9 As a result, the Court reasoned
that the innocent owners in past cases were not protected when some
basis of negligence by act or omission was found.' 20 As one of the last
civil forfeiture cases the Supreme Court heard before Bennis v. Michi-
gan, the Austin Court seemed to have firmly established that forfei-
ture can serve punitive purposes.12' As a preface to Bennis, Austin, by
reviewing and analyzing the history of civil forfeiture extensively,
seemed to signal a change in the law-perhaps more concern for ex-
cessiveness and innocence would be given-then again, maybe not. 22
117. Id. at 609-10. The government argued that this forfeiture should be considered remedial,
but the Court rejected the argument, stating that although "forfeiture of contraband ... [is]...
remedial.... [this] Court ... previously has rejected ... [the extension of] ... that reasoning to
conveyances used to transport illegal liquor . . . [and] the same, without question, is true of the
properties involved here." Id. at 621. Note also that further support for the notion that forfei-
ture is punitive can be found in the language used in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965), where the Supreme Court reversed the forfeiture of an automobile because
of an illegal search, reasoning that forfeiture is quasi-criminal in character, directed toward pe-
nalizing the commission of illegal offenses. Id. at 700. The Court added, "[t]here is nothing even
remotely criminal in possessing an automobile." Id. at 699.
118. Austin, 509 U.S. at 619. By looking at the Federal Controlled Substances Act (under
which Austin's seizure was instituted), the Court found that because the statute's innocent owner
provision focused on the culpability of the owner, Congress clearly understood that those provi-
sions serve to deter and punish. Id. at 621-22.
119. Id. at 615. The Court further reasoned that even the personification fiction rests on the
notion that an owner who allows personal property to become involved in an offense has been
negligent. Id. at 616.
120. Id.
121. In late 1993, the Supreme Court heard another civil forfeiture case. In United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), the Supreme Court again restrained the
government's use of civil forfeiture in real property actions by holding that the Due Process
Clause requires the government to afford notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard before
seizing real property subject to civil forfeiture. Id. at 62.
122. In fact, although James Daniel Good's holding, see supra note 121, was sympathetic to
property owners in theory, in that case the government seized the property four and one half
years after the property owner was convicted on drug charges. Id. at 46. Although the Court
acknowledged that the government was financially motivated, it failed to halt the proceeding.
Id. at 56. This decision failed to curb the abuses of using forfeiture laws to make money for law
enforcement. See HYDE, supra note 7, at 34. In fact, the attorney for the property owner in the
James Daniel Good case said he had eight other small crime cases in which police had gone back
several years to resurrect cases for forfeiture actions. Id. at 35.
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II. SUBJECT OPINION: Bennis v. Michigan123
Tina Bennis cleaned offices at night, worked as a part-time cook in
a school cafeteria, and worked a newspaper route with one of her five
children to help make ends meet. 124 She and her husband, a Detroit
area steelworker, 2 5 co-owned an eleven year old Pontiac. 2 6 A few
weeks after purchasing the Pontiac for $600,127 Tina Bennis's husband,
while en route from work to home, drove to a neighborhood reputed
for prostitution and engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute in the
car.' 28 Mr. Bennis was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor of
gross indecency.' 2 9 Since the illicit act occurred in the car, the Wayne
County prosecutor filed a complaint alleging that the vehicle was a
public nuisance subject to abatement in accordance with a Michigan
statute that provided for the abatement of any "building, vehicle,
boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation
or prostitution or gambling.' 30
The circuit court declared the car to be a nuisance and abated it,
terminating the couple's interest in the automobile. 131 Tina Bennis
protested the forfeiture contending that: a one-time act was not suffi-
cient to be a nuisance; 132 lewdness was never proved; 133 and the State
failed to demonstrate knowledge on her part of her husband's lewd-
ness. 34 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's
decision, holding that: Mr. Bennis's act, although lewd, was not a vio-
lation of the Michigan statute because a one-time event does not con-
stitute a nuisance;135 the prosecution failed to prove that an act of
123. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
124. David G. Savage, Innocence Punished: Justice Ginsburg Keys Surprise Ruling in Double
Jeopardy Case, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 47.
125. Id.
126. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
127. Id.
128. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994).
129. Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
130. The Michigan statute in question, The Revised Judicature Act of 1961, provides:
Any building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assigna-
tion or prostitution or gambling, or used by, or kept for the use of prostitutes or other
disorderly persons.., is declared a nuisance,.., and all.., nuisances shall be enjoined
and abated as provided in this act and as provided in the court rules. Any person or his
or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any build-
ing, vehicle, or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this section is
guilty of a nuisance.
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp. 1995); Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996 n.2.
131. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
132. Id. at 733.
133. Id. at 734.
134. Id. at 732.
135. Id. at 734.
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prostitution occurred in the car (there was no proof of payment); 136
and regardless of the statute's language, Michigan Supreme Court
precedent interpreting this section prevented the State from abating
Tina Bennis's interest absent proof that she knew how the car would
be used.137
On appeal by the State, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's decision and reinstated the forfeiture.138 The State
Supreme Court found that, because the action was against the car and
not Mr. Bennis, proof of payment to establish solicitation of a prosti-
tute was unnecessary. 39 The court also found that Mr. Bennis con-
tributed to an existing nuisance by "enter[ing] a neighborhood that
[was] a known place for prostitution and used his vehicle to engage in
illicit activity. '1 40 The court addressed Tina Bennis's innocence, but
concluded that in light of precedent, specifically Van Oster141 and
Calero-Toledo,142 Michigan's failure to provide an innocent owner de-
fense was "without constitutional consequence."' 143
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Tina Bennis argued
that she was an innocent owner, and that the Michigan statute, by not
providing for an innocent owner defense, was unconstitutional for vio-
lating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.144 In a five-to-four opinion
136. Id. at 734-35.
137. Id. at 732. The Michigan Appellate Court's decision is not surprising since in In re Forfei-
ture of $53.00, 444 N.W.2d 182 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), the court held that in a forfeiture proceed-
ing of co-owned property, "the state may only forfeit the ownership interest of the non-innocent
owner. If, for example, the innocent owner has a 50% interest in the vehicle, the property may
be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the state and the innocent co-owner." Id. at
189.
138. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 495 (Mich. 1994).
139. Id. at 486.
140. Id. Although in many prior abatement cases, the state provided or implied the property's
nuisane status with several acts, the Court justified the car's forfeiture for a single act, under a
nuisance statute. It reasoned that the car, by entering a neighborhood that was a nuisance, was
"used for" the continuance of a nuisance. Id. at 491. In fact, the Michigan Supreme Court
emphasized the fact that Mr. Bennis engaged in this act with a known prostitute in an area
reputed for illicit activity, and noted that its position was limited to situations in which a nuisance
condition exists, admitting that "a vehicle could not be abated if the same situation arose in
another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods [a wealthy neighborhood], where certainly no
such nuisance condition exists." Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 491 n.22.
141. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
143. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494. In Justice Levin's dissenting opinion, which analyzed the
construction of the statute at issue, he determined that the majority had "enlarge[d] the applica-
tion of the nuisance abatement statute beyond its letter and beyond any prior application in its
seventy-year history." Id. at 505 (Levin, J., dissenting).
144. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997-98 (1996). The Due Process Clause provides:
"[No] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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written by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court affirmed the Michi-
gan Supreme Court's ruling, and held that Michigan's failure to pro-
vide an innocent owner defense did not offend the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 145
A. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,146 first focused on
the petitioner's due process claim and held that there was no law sup-
porting Bennis's argument that an innocent owner should be pro-
tected against forfeiture proceedings. 147 The majority reasoned that
"a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest in
property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property
is put even though the owner did not know that it was to be put to
such use."' 148 The Court cited The Palmyra,149 Dobbins's Distillery, 50
and Van Oster15' to provide an historical basis for the principle that
culpability in owners is not necessary to constitutionally forfeit prop-
erty.152 The Court acknowledged that such cases have left room for
an owner to be granted relief when an owner asserts that the car was
taken without consent, but not when consent was given to use the car
but not to perform the illegal act.' 53
The Court then analogized Bennis to Calero-Toledo, which it con-
sidered to be the most recent case on point.' 54 The Court ruled that
the passage in Calero-Toledo, which Bennis relied on, was obiter dic-
tum and therefore irrelevant. 155 Rehnquist reasoned that Tina Bennis
was similarly situated to the various owners involved in the forfeiture
cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827.156 Like the owners in those
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Takings Clause provides: "[P]rivate property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
145. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
146. Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
147. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
148. Id. at 998.
149. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
152. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
153. Id. at 999 n.5.
154. Id. at 999; see supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
155. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999. The Calero-Toledo opinion stated that "it would be difficult to
reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in
and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leas-
ing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
156. See supra Part I.B.
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cases, she did not know that her car would be used in an illegal activity
that would subject it to forfeiture. 157 Therefore, Rehnquist held that
her result should be the same as the others. 158 The majority empha-
sized that the circuit court called the forfeiture an equitable action, as
opposed to a punitive one, 59 and found that the deterrent effect of
forfeiture was sufficient justification.' 60
Chief Justice Rehnquist briefly addressed Tina Bennis's claim that
the forfeiture was also violative of the Fifth Amendment, but deter-
mined that, because the forfeiture did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, the government was not required to compensate an
owner for property it had lawfully acquired through governmental au-
thority.161 Just as the Court had done throughout the twentieth cen-
tury in forfeiture cases where the facts inferred harm to innocent
owners, Rehnquist concluded that, "the cases authorizing actions of
the kind at issue are 'too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."1 62
B. The Concurring Opinions
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas emphasized that an "un-
fairness" argument like the one lodged by both Tina Bennis and the
dissent was not persuasive in a forfeiture case, given the lengthy his-
tory of forfeiture against innocent owners.' 63 Thomas reiterated that:
[The State's motivation is] to punish for deterrence and perhaps
also for retributive purposes, persons who may have colluded or ac-
quiesced in criminal Use of their property, or who may at least have
negligently entrusted their property to someone likely to use it for
misfeasance. But,... it does not want to have to prove (or to refute
proof regarding) collusion, acquiescence, or negligence. 164
Thomas further reasoned that the abatement was justifiable on reme-
dial grounds and, therefore, could not be properly described as pun-
ishing an innocent owner.' 65 He opined that the Bennis decision was a
157. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1000. By declaring the forfeiture to be equitable, and not punitive, the majority
freed itself from having to discuss and justify punishment of Mrs. Bennis.
160. Id. Although Rehnquist differentiated punitive acts from deterrents, Justice Blackmun,
in Austin, had pointed out that earlier Supreme Court precedent established that "a civil sanc-
tion that ... [can] be explained as ... serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punish-
ment, as we have come to understand the term." Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621
(1993) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
161. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
162. Id. (citing Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
163. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring).
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. Id. at 1002.
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reminder that the Constitution does not prohibit everything that is
intensely undesirable. 166
Justice Ginsburg also wrote a brief concurring opinion.167 Her con-
currence was based on three factors. First, Ginsburg believed that
John Bennis, as an equal owner, at all times "had [Tina Bennis's] con-
sent to use the car."'1 68 Second, she believed that it was critical to the
Michigan Court that the nuisance abatement proceeding was an equi-
table action. 169 And third, Ginsburg thought that because of the car's
age and value, 170 there was "practically nothing" to give Tina Bennis
after subtracting costs.17 1 In Justice Ginsburg's view, the State "ha[d]
not embarked on an experiment to punish innocent third parties...
[but] to deter Johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contrib-
ute to neighborhood blight.' 72
C. The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy wrote the dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and
Souter, proposed that the majority opinion's logic "would permit
states to exercise unbridled power to confiscate vast amounts of prop-
erty where professional criminals had engaged in illegal acts."'1 73
Looking to historical precedents cited by the majority, Stevens
pointed out that in the admiralty and earlier twentieth-century cases,
"the vehicles or property actually facilitated the offenses them-
selves."'1 74 In the Bennis case, however, Stevens argued that the for-
166, Id. at 1001-02. Surprisingly, in his concurring opinion in James Daniel Good, Justice
Thomas voiced concern over the breadth of new civil forfeiture statutes, and noted that because
current practices "seem to be far removed from the legal fiction upon which the doctrine [was]
based, it may be necessary-in an appropriate case-to reevaluate our generally deferential ap-
proach to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture." United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 81-82 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra notes 121-22.
Unfortunately for Tina Bennis, Justice Thomas did not think hers was the "appropriate case."
167. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The Pontiac was eleven years old and purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600. Id.
171. Id. Maybe Ginsburg would have ruled for Tina Bennis "if the car had been a nice new
Mercedes worth $40,000, instead of an old Pontiac worth $600.00." Stuart Taylor, Jr., Law of
Forfeiture Takes a Big Step Back; Wrong Rationale Used to Uphold Confiscation, Sale of Innocent
Victim's Property, FuLTON CouNrT DAILY REP., Mar. 11, 1996, available in LEXIS, Regnws
Library, Fulton File.
172. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003. Ginsburg's opinion ran counter to expectations from her com-
ments at oral arguments and her larger reputation for liberalism on the bench. Savage, supra
note 124, at 48.
173. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1005. Justice Stevens made reference to Dobbins's Distillery, Van Oster, Gold-
smith-Grant, and The Palmyra on this point. Id. at 1004-06.
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feited property was not sufficiently connected to the offense
committed by the petitioner's husband.175 In addressing the issue of
whether forfeiture is intended as remedial or punitive, Stevens as-
serted that the majority's contention that the forfeiture served only
remedial purposes was unpersuasive because "confiscating [the car
did] not disable [Mr. Bennis] from using other venues for similar ille-
gal rendezvous."' 176
Stevens further reasoned that Austin v. United States compelled re-
versal. 177 Looking to Austin, Stevens pointed out that Justice Scalia,
in his concurring opinion, had agreed that if an isolated drug sale hap-
pened to take place in a building, the building could hardly be re-
garded as an instrumentality of the offense.1 78 Consequently, Stevens
felt that the majority's use of historical justification for the forfeiture
ignored Austin. 179 In Austin, the Court had reasoned that prior deci-
sions upholding the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property had
rested on "the notion that the owner ha[d] been negligent in allowing
his property to be misused and that he [wa]s properly punished for
that negligence.' 180 That justification could not be accurately applied
to the Bennis case.' 8'
Addressing the majority's use of Calero-Toledo, Stevens noted that
the Court in that case had found the innocent owner negligent be-
cause it had determined that if all reasonable steps had been taken to
prevent the yacht's illegal use, the owner would not have been pun-
ished. 182 In contrast, Stevens reasoned that Tina Bennis could not be
blamed for failing to take all "reasonable steps" to prevent the illegal
use of her car because she had no knowledge that her husband would
do anything other than come straight home from work as he had al-
ways done.183 Finally, Stevens asserted that the fundamental unfair-
ness of punishing Tina Bennis had been addressed in precedent, which
175. Id. at 1006.
176. Id. at 1006-07. If the State was concerned about Mr. Bennis driving to pick up prosti-
tutes, the forfeiture of his driver's license would have been a more logical seizure. (Although
such a punishment would undoubtedly be challenged as an excessive fine.) Stevens's dissent also
points out that according to trial testimony, the petitioner's husband was seen twice during the
previous summer, without the car, soliciting prostitutes in the same neighborhood. Id. There-
fore, again it seems clear that the car was not the nuisance in this case.
177. Id. at 1006.
178. Id. (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
179. Id. at 1006-07.
180. Id. at 1007 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 615).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1008 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co, 416 U.S. 663, 688-90
(1974)).
183. Id. Stevens compared Mrs. Bennis's blamelessness in the act to a victim of theft,
wherein the car is later used for criminal purposes. Id.
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held that punishing people who have done nothing wrong is
unconstitutional. 184
Justice Kennedy's brief dissenting opinion emphasized that the ad-
miralty case law that allowed forfeiture of innocent owners' property
"evolv[ed] ... from the necessity of finding some source of compensa-
tion for injuries done by a vessel whose responsible owners were often
half a world away and beyond the practical reach of the law and its
processes. ' 185 Kennedy reasoned that because the automobile in Ben-
nis was not used to transport contraband, the seizure went beyond the
line of cases that sustained forfeiture to suppress that type of traffic. 186
Finally, Kennedy determined that "[n]othing in the rationale of the
Michigan Supreme Court... supports the suggestion that the value of
[Tina Bennis's] co-ownership is so insignificant as to be beneath the
law's protection.' ' 187
III. ANALYSIS
The Bennis v. Michigan decision is an example of the harm that can
be done by blindly following outdated precedent without looking to
the policies behind those decisions. This Note's analysis of the Bennis
v. Michigan decision consists of four Subparts. Subpart A critiques
the majority's choice of precedent. Subpart B criticizes the majority's
failure to follow standards set forth in prior case law. Subpart C dis-
cusses the continued and unbridled use of the personification fiction.
Finally, Subpart D analyzes whether the forfeiture action in this case
can be called remedial or whether it is punitive.
A. The Majority's Choice of Precedent
The majority's justification for denying Mrs. Bennis relief rested on
"the long history" of civil forfeiture that has ignored the rights of in-
nocent owners. The cases presented, however, are distinguishable
from the facts of the Bennis case and, therefore, the cited legal princi-
ples were improperly applied. 188 In addition, the Calero-Toledo deci-
sion, though recent, was selectively construed to favor the majority
opinion. 89 Finally, the Court turned a blind eye to the innocent
184. Id. at 1007. Stevens listed several cases to establish this point, including: TXO Produc-
tion Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993), Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 363 (1978), and Southwestern Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482,
490-91 (1915). Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1008.
185. Id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at toll.
187. Id.
188. See infra Part III.A.1.
189. See infra Part III.A.2.
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owner statutes in the last fifty years which have exemplified, through
case law, Congress's intent to protect owners like Tina Bennis.190
1. The Majority's Improper Use of Admiralty, Customs, and
Revenue Case Law
Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion by citing The Pal-
myra,191 Dobbins's Distillery,192 and Van Oster,193 for the general
proposition that "'it has always been held ... that the acts of [the
possessors] bind the interest of the owner ... whether he be innocent
or guilty.""' a94 However, the cases cited by the majority are distin-
guishable from Bennis in four ways: a) negligence was never alleged
or inferred in Bennis; b) the property in Bennis was not an instrument
of the crime; c) Bennis involved co-owners; and d) Mr. Bennis, the
wrongdoer, was punished for his crime.
a. Negligence Was Never Alleged or Inferred in Bennis
As the dissent in Bennis pointed out, the Supreme Court surveyed
the same historical precedents in Austin and held that all of its prior
forfeiture decisions rested "at bottom, on the notion that the owner
ha[d] been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that
he [was] properly punished for that negligence.' 1 95 In The Palmyra
and other admiralty cases, the owner entrusted his ship to a captain
and crew that, presumably, he hired.196 In Dobbins's Distillery, where
the owner had leased the property to a lessee, the Court determined
that the owner had a duty to know what the lessee was doing on his
property. 197 Therefore, because the owner's innocence was due to ig-
norance, the Court held that his innocence was no excuse. 198 Finally,
in Van Oster, the Court asserted that negligent entrustment of one's
car justifiably subjects the owner to whatever consequences arise from
that entrustment. 199 All three cases attacked the "innocent" owners'
190. See infra Part III.A.3.
191. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
194. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 998 (1996) (quoting Dobbins's Distillery v. United
States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877)).
195. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615
(1993)).
196. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
197. See Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 399 ("[I]f [an owner] knowingly ... permits his land to
be used as a site for a distillery, the law places him on the same footing as if he were the
distiller.").
198. Id.
199. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
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act or omission to justify the forfeiture. The line of reasoning per-
meating all of these decisions suggests a duty on the part of an owner
and a breach of that duty.
Tina Bennis, on the other hand, cannot persuasively be called negli-
gent in allowing her husband to drive a car he co-owned. Nor can it
be said that she breached a duty to inquire about what activity would
go on in the car. In contrast to precedent, Tina Bennis did not hire
her husband to drive the car, she did not entrust her car to him, nor
did she have a duty to inquire about the activities of an adult who had
equal ownership rights to the car. Using The Palmyra, Dobbins's Dis-
tillery, and Van Oster against Tina Bennis, implies negligence, which in
turn infers that the Court did not thoroughly analyze the precedent on
which it relied.
b. The Property in Bennis Was Not an Instrument
In The Palmyra, Dobbins's Distillery, and Van Oster, the offending
property that was seized was more than incidental to the crime, it was
an instrument of the crime. 200 To commit piracy, one must have a
ship. To illegally run a distillery, one must have a distillery. Further-
more, to illegally transport liquor, one must have transportation. The
car in the Bennis situation, however, cannot easily be called an "in-
strument" of the crime. More likely, Mr. Bennis's use of the car was
incidental. Solicitation of a prostitute can occur in the street, in an
alley, in a hotel room, or by telephone. As Justice Stevens pointed
out, one does not need an automobile to solicit a prostitute. In fact,
Mr. Bennis had been spotted in that neighborhood before without the
car at issue.201
c. Bennis Involved Co-Owners
In The Palmyra, Dobbins's Distillery, and Van Oster, there was only
one owner.202 The owner in each case, though innocent, had volunta-
rily relinquished possession of the property to the wrongdoer.203 In
Bennis, there were two owners of the forfeited vehicle. 204 To say that
Tina Bennis was in the same position as the "innocent owners" in The
Palmyra, Dobbins's Distillery, or Van Oster and, therefore, should be
200. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike the precedent
used by the majority, Tina Bennis's car was not an instrument of the wrong).
201. Id. at 1007.
202. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 2 (1827); Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 399; Van
Oster, 272 U.S. at 465-66.
203. Palnyra, 25 U.S. at 2; Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 399; Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466.
204. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
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treated the same,205 is an inaccurate comparison. As the dissent
pointed out, "[she] did not 'entrust' the car to her husband .... ,206
As a co-owner, she could not have stopped him from taking what was
rightfully his.207
d. Mr. Bennis, the Wrongdoer, Was Punished for His Crime
Finally, at the time that The Palmyra and Dobbins's Distillery were
decided, actual wrongdoers were often unreachable by the courts. For
example, in cases like The Palmyra, the owner's involvement in the
alleged wrong was disregarded out of necessity. 20 8 In times of piracy,
when the owner of the ship was half-way across the world, the owner's
involvement could not be a foremost concern.209 This country did not
yet have laws in place to prosecute the men on board, so the best
defense was to seize their ships.210 Unlike admiralty cases where the
owners were often unreachable by the courts, the Michigan courts
could theoretically reach the wrongdoers, and in the Bennis case, did
convict the husband of a misdemeanor.
Additionally, in cases like Dobbins's Distillery, practical considera-
tions were at play behind the reasoning used for forfeiture against the
tax evaders.21' Tax evaders often owed the government massive
amounts of money, therefore, seizing all property attached to the
wrongdoing justified equitable considerations. 212 In contrast to tax
evaders whose property was the only real means of collecting debts,
the car in Bennis did not substitute for any money owed to the govern-
ment by the owner. The district court did not impose forfeiture be-
cause Mr. Bennis could not pay his fine. In fact, Mr. Bennis did pay a
fine.213 Therefore, the majority's use of such outdated and obviously
205. See supra note 157-58 and accompanying text.
206. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. The Florida legislature has acknowledged the difficulty of holding a spouse responsi-
ble for the other's actions. See In re Forfeiture of 1978 BMW Automobile, 524 So. 2d 1077 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In In re Forfeiture of 1978 BMW Automobile, the court distinguished co-
owning spouses from other co-owners. The court held that although the "reasonably innocent
owner" defense is available to husband-wife co-ownership situations (which would prohibit for-
feiture where one spouse is reasonably innocent), in a father-son co-owner situation (as was the
case) knowledge of wrongful use by one owner is sufficient to justify forfeiture. Id. at 1080.
208. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
212. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 59-61 (1993).
213. Even the Amicus Brief written supporting the government's action stated that "[t]l'.e
State [did] not suggest that the forfeiture of vehicles under the circumstances of this case is
justified by an overriding government need." Amicus Curiae Brief of United States, Bennis v.
Michigan, 116 U.S. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
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distinguishable case law only adds fuel to critics' arguments that this
area of the law needs to be revamped.2 14
2. The Majority's Over-Simplified Comparison to Calero-Toledo
The majority in Bennis focused on Calero-Toledo as "the most re-
cent decision on point" because the innocent owner's property was
forfeited under a state statute that did not have an innocent owner
defense. 215 But again, there is a distinction. In Calero-Toledo, the
"innocent owner" was a lessor.216 The lessee was given permission to
use the boat.217 The Court even stated in its opinion that "confisca-
tion may have the desirable effect of inducing [lessors] to exercise
greater care in transferring possession of their property. '21 8 Tina
Bennis, however, did not "transfer possession" of her property be-
cause she was a co-owner. Mr. Bennis's use of the car cannot be
called transfer of her property since at all times it was also his
property.
The majority looked at the holding of Calero-Toledo, but ignored
the reasoning behind the decision. The lengthy discussion in the
Calero-Toledo decision, if applied, would have exonerated Mrs. Ben-
nis.219 The Calero-Toledo opinion applied the "reasonable steps" test
in holding the owner accountable. 220 That reasoning, in support of
upholding the forfeiture, was that the "appellee voluntarily entrusted
the lessees with possession of the yacht, and no allegation has been
made or proof offered that the company did all that it reasonably
could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use. '221 Had the
majority applied the "reasonable steps" test to Mrs. Bennis, it is diffi-
cult to imagine that it could have found her to have failed in taking
"all reasonable steps" to prevent her husband from using a car that
214. See, e.g., Raymond Banoun et al., Making a Strong Argument for Civil Forfeiture Reform,
MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP., Aug. 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Leader File.
215. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680 (1974).
216. Id. at 665.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 688.
219. See id. at 689-91.
220. Id. at 690.
221. Id. (emphasis added); see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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was equally his to use.222 How could Tina Bennis prove a negative?
How could any innocent owner for that matter?223
3. The Court Disregarded the History of Protecting Innocent
Owners
By handing down this opinion, the majority of the Court completely
disregarded the extended history of innocent owner defenses both in
England and America in civil forfeiture proceedings. 224 The Court
painted a picture of a historical disregard for innocence. However,
concern for the innocent has existed along with, and prior to all the
precedent the Court cited.225 Federal statutes aimed at many twenti-
eth-century societal ills have implemented innocent owner defenses to
prevent the type of injustice that occurred in this case.226
A review of cases that have been tried in the last fifty years under
federal statutes with innocent owner defenses provides an awareness
that congressional intent is firmly rooted in preventing the punish-
ment of the truly innocent. 22 7 Had the Court looked to some of these
cases, it would have seen that denying the necessity of an innocent
owner defense in Bennis would perpetuate and give strength to the
inconsistency of forfeiture decisions. As illustrated in One 1981 Dat-
sun 280ZX, One Parcel of Real Property, and Devito, co-owners of
property similarly situated to Tina Bennis were afforded relief solely
because the innocent owners were fortunate enough to be subject to
forfeiture under a federal statute.228
222. The burden would have been on Mrs. Bennis to show that she had taken all reasonable
steps to prevent the illegal use, however, as her argument to the Supreme Court asserted, "if one
has no knowledge or reason to know of a wrongful use, then one cannot be expected to take
affirmative steps to prevent that use." Petitioner's Brief, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994
(1996) (No. 94-8729).
223. This is a common criticism of the current civil forfeiture enforcement law because even
with "innocent owner" provisions in place, the owner has to prove his or her own innocence.
Civil Asset Forfeiture: Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statements of Gerald B. Lefcourt, President-Elect, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers and David B. Smith, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Civil Asset Forfei-
ture: Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996)
(written statement of E.E. Edwards et al., Co-Chairs, on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal
Defense Lawyers). However, one aspect of the current reform proposal is the shifting of the
burden to the government. See Banoun et al., supra note 214.
224. See supra Part I.A. & I.C.2.
225. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the early English statutes that supported innocent owners'
rights); supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text (discussing cases of forfeiture under the Fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act); supra notes 84-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Na-
tional Prohibition Act).
226. See supra Part I.C.2.
227. See supra Part I.C.2.
228. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
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B. The Majority Failed to Follow the Standards Set Forth in
Precedent
In the precedent used by the majority, holdings against innocent
owners were determined by looking either at the owner's negligent
entrustment of the property or failure to take reasonable steps. In fact,
in Bennis, both the government and the petitioner argued in their re-
spective briefs about which test should be applied to the situation.22 9
But the majority of the Court adopted neither standard and simply
rested on the fact that in past cases, forfeiture of innocent owners'
property had been upheld and it "[was] too firmly fixed in the punitive
and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced. '230 If
the Court had attempted to apply either standard, as the dissent
pointed out, Tina Bennis's interest would have been protected since
there was no negligence on her part or a failure to "take reasonable
steps."'231 The dissent accurately noted that "she had no knowledge of
her husband's plans to do anything with the car except 'come directly
home from work,' as he had always done before; and that she even
called 'Missing Persons' when he failed to return on the night in ques-
tion. '232 Not only does this holding fail to provide guidance for future
decisions as to which rationale should be applied in a similar situation,
but it indicates a failure to thoroughly study the precedent, the poli-
cies behind earlier decisions, and the implications of the Court's own
holding.
C. The Continued and Unhampered Use of the Personification
Fiction
The Court chose to follow previous cases that disregarded concern
for innocent owners by emphasizing the personification fiction. Such
a fiction may have had its place in admiralty decisions of the early
nineteenth century due to the inability to find or hold owners account-
able for their crimes, and still may have a place in removing contra-
band from society since the property's very existence is illegal. But
229. In the Brief for Petitioner, Bennis argued that regardless of which test the Court applied,
she would meet the standard, but that the negligent entrustment standard should be applied
because the reasonable steps test was vague and would perpetuate widely divergent determina-
tions. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). In the
Brief for the Respondent, the government argued that the reasonable steps test should be ap-
plied and that the property should be forfeited because the petitioner did not prove at trial that
she took "all reasonable steps" to prevent her husband from having illicit sex in the car. Amicus
Curiae Brief of United States, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
230. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (1996).
231. 116 S. Ct. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the personification of property unencumbered by innocent owner de-
fenses serves to rationalize judicial doctrines based not on considera-
tion of fundamental rights, but on policy considerations, usually
driven by economic 233 or political factors.234
To justify taking away the property of someone who has not com-
mitted a crime should not be so easily sidestepped by saying, in effect,
that is the way it has been, so that is the way it is.235 By using the
personification of the car as justification of the forfeiture, the Court
failed to be concerned with the due process rights of Tina Bennis.
Such a doctrine has no place in a society that is supposedly grounded
in the "unalienable rights" of its citizens. 236
The use of this fiction displaces the long established jurisprudence
of this country regarding citizens' rights.237 The property, obviously
inanimate, has no counsel, and is convicted (forfeited) by a mere
showing of probable cause of some illegal use. The property owner
must then institute a challenge to the forfeiture and bear the burden
of proving his property's innocence. Not only does this defy the "in-
nocent until proven guilty" concept that lies at the base of our judicial
proceedings, but also, as the Bennis case illustrated, it is difficult for
an owner to prove a negative. Many constitutional rights are left aside
by proceeding against the property as the guilty party,238 and since
there is no arguing that property can actually be guilty of committing a
crime, there can be no sufficient justification for divorcing civil forfei-
233. A July 1990 U.S. Department of Justice bulletin sent to all United States Attorneys
stated: "We must significantly increase forfeiture production to reach our budget target."
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 56 n.2 (1993) (citing Executive
Office for United States Attorneys, 38 U.S. A rNY's BULL. 180 (1990)).
234. One commentator has noted that to the extent that Tina Bennis shares a similar inno-
cence with previous owners that have been afforded no relief, reconsideration of those cases may
be justified because, "forfeiture has become a standard tactic in the war on drugs ... [transform-
ing itself] into a billion-dollar government industry." Donald A. Dripps, Innocence Is No De-
fense, TRIAL, June 1996, at 68.
235. In Justice McKenna's opinion in Goldsmith-Grant, upholding the forfeiture of an inno-
cent owner's property, he stated that, "[i]f the case were the first of its kind, it and its apparent
paradoxes might compel a lengthy discussion... [because] it seems to violate that justice which
should be the foundation of the due process of law required by the Constitution." Goldsmith-
Grant v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
236. However, one commentator opined: "[T]he Court will not seriously scrutinize the injury
to property rights, because it does not regard such rights as worthy of the same respect as the
rights of an accused felon, a member of a minority race, or a First Amendment dissident." LEVY,
supra note 11, at 88.
237. For further analysis and criticism of the personification fiction, see generally, Piety, supra
note 13.
238. Indigents, for example, have no right to free counsel to help them demonstrate that their
'home' is not guilty of wrongdoing when the government has seized it under a mistaken belief of
probable cause of illegal activity. HYDE, supra note 7, at 81.
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ture proceedings from a property owner's innocence. The fiction,
although perhaps founded in logic, has led to such illogical use that it
should no longer form the basis of a contemporary court's opinion.2 39
D. Did Bennis Punish an Innocent Person or Serve A
Remedial Goal?
Confiscation of contraband is characterized as remedial because it
removes dangerous or illegal items from society. Similarly, the early
admiralty cases justified the forfeiture of ships as the only way to re-
move the threat from society-since without the ships, the offenders
could not continue piracy. But as Austin points out, forfeiture can
serve both remedial and punitive purposes.2 40 For example, a prece-
dent like Calero-Toledo that upholds the forfeiture of an innocent les-
sor's property can be said to serve both remedial and punitive
purposes since the Court was attempting to establish a higher level of
care.241 The Supreme Court in Bennis justified the forfeiture as reme-
dial, but the evidence points to a more punitive purpose.
No remedial justification can be established to support the forfei-
ture in Bennis. Abating the car does nothing to further the goal of
removing prostitution from the streets and does nothing to further the
goal of ridding Mr. Bennis of the means to accomplish his desire to be
with a prostitute in that area.2 42 Therefore, if the Court cannot justify
the forfeiture under remedial grounds, its effect is purely punitive.2 43
In fact, the Solicitor General, in support of the government in Bennis,
stated that "[t]his case involves the punitive forfeiture of non-contra-
band," and supported this belief by quoting the State's explanation
that "[c]onfiscation of an automobile in the context that defendant's
car was seized.., is swift and certain punishment of the voluntary vice
consumer."'244 The Court, by condoning such motivation for forfei-
ture, impliedly admits that it is sustaining punishment to an innocent
239. In fact, several commentators favor the ban of civil forfeiture all together, recommending
instead that criminal forfeiture (applied only toward convicted criminals) be used. See generally
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs: Lessons from
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEo L. REV. 79, 127 (1996); Leach & Malcolm, supra note 30.
240. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 613-22 (1993) (providing a lengthy discussion of the
remedial versus the punitive debate).
241. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687-88 (1974); see supra notes
77-79 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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person-contradicting the foundation of this country's beliefs.2 45 The
Bennis decision, by failing to recognize the unique position of co-own-
ers of property, has highlighted the need for change.
IV. IMPAcT
The impact of the Bennis decision is debatable. 246 As one author
wrote: "It doesn't take much political sophistication to realize that it
is far more likely for legislatures to exploit than to remedy the Court's
holding in Bennis.'' 247 In contrast, another commentator wrote that
this decision may have a positive impact by energizing reform on Cap-
itol Hill.24 8 Currently, there is a bill in Congress, introduced by Rep-
resentative Henry Hyde of Illinois, called the Civil Asset Forfeiture
Reform Act that seeks to further reform of civil forfeitures. 249 The
reform, in part, is seeking to: 1) shift the burden to the government to
show that the property is subject to forfeiture, 250 2) provide for a
"substantial hardship" exception that, if proven, would give the prop-
erty back to the claimant pending the final disposition of the proceed-
ing, 3) provide legal counsel to indigents, 251 4) clarify, in a hope of
245. It has been asserted that the goal of forfeiture is not based on remedial or punitive
grounds, but rather economic goals. Former New York City police commissioner Patrick Mur-
phy testified before Congress that "[tihe large monetary value of forfeitures ... has created a
great temptation for state and local police departments to target assets rather than criminal
activity." HYDE, supra note 7, at 9 (citing Carl Horowitz, What Can Government Take from
You?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1, 2). Most police departments have "quietly
adopted a policy of 'structured arrests,' making certain that undercover agents purchase drugs or
make deals when they are physically located in a valuable building or on a high-priced tract of
land" that can then be seized by the police. HYDE, supra note 7, at 31.
246. Ultimately, the significance of Bennis "may well be the doctrinal confusion [it adds] to an
already confusing area of law." Ivan K. Fong, Paying for White Collar Crime, N.J. L.J., Aug. 26,
1996, at S-18.
247. See Dripps, supra note 234, at 68.
248. Marcia Coylf, Critics: Forfeiture Ruling Certain to Spur Reform, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18,
1996, at A12. One forfeiture expert stated: "The Bennis decision is so out of touch with the
times and political currents that most prosecutors are simply not going to take advantage of it."
Id.
249. H.R. 1835 was introduced on June 10, 1997. H.R. 1835, 105th Cong. (1997). On June 19,
1997, after pressure from the Clinton administration, H.R. 1965 was introduced, a milder version
of the same. H.R. 1965, 105th Cong. (1997); Editorial, A Botched Reform, ORANGE Co. REGIS-
TER, Oct. 27, 1996, at B06, available in LEXIS, Regnws Library, Ocreg File. In addition, Repre-
sentative Owen Pickett (Va.) sponsored H.R. 428, known as the "Innocent Owners' Forfeiture
Protection Act of 1997." Michele M. Jochner, The Supreme Court Turns Back the Clock on Civil
Forfeiture in Bennis, 85 ILL. B.J. 314, 321 (1997). This bill was introduced on January 9, 1997.
Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Blcast File (Feb. 19, 1998).
250. Surprisingly, the Justice Department now agrees that the burden of proof should be on
the government and not the property owner. Banoun et al., supra note 214, at 1.
251. "Currently, there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil forfeiture cases.
This is one of the reasons why so few forfeitures are challenged." HYDE, supra note 7, at 81.
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protecting more owners, the innocent owner defense,2 52 and 5) force
the government to pay for its negligence.253 But there are two
problems with this legislation. First, it may not pass.254 Second, it is
unclear what effect such an Act would have on statutes like the one
that determined Tina Bennis's fate.255 As the bill is now written,
states remain free to use local nuisance statutes with no further goal
than to raise money for the state.256 If culpability is not a factor, any
local government running over budget may use these statutes to raise
money.257 On the state level, some minor reforms have passed, but
overall, asset forfeiture has only expanded.2 58 In California, for exam-
ple, thirty percent of asset seizures are in non-drug related cases.259
And automobile forfeiture by police has become an especially lucra-
tive national trend because cars are easy to seize, and valuable for
252. The Justice Department apparently favors a uniform innocent owner defense, but one
that is much narrower than the one currently provided under the Controlled Substances Act.
Civil Asset Forfeiture: Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of David B. Smith, on behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers).
253. This provision would allow property owners to sue the government for negligence.
HYDE, supra note 7, at 82. Currently, the government is exempted from liability for damage
caused by handling and storage during seizure. Id. Stephen Cassella, the Deputy Chief of Asset
Forfeiture at the Justice Department, said he supports giving property owners the right to sue
over damaged property. Matt Pottinger, Las Vegas Man Recounts How He Lost Everything to
Government, STATES NEWS SERVICE, June 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Sns File.
254. Hyde has been trying to pass a bill since 1993, see LEVY, supra note 11, at 210, but
nobody wants to change laws still largely perceived as weapons against drug dealers. Susan
Adams, Forfeiting Rights, FORBES, May 20, 1996, at 96. Hyde's original bill, H.R. 1835, was
given a 30% chance of passing in the House, and a 9% chance of passing in the Senate. Search
of LEXIS, Legis Library, Blcast File (Feb. 19, 1998). H.R. 1965, a slightly watered-down version
of Hyde's bill, has been given a 64% chance of passing in the House, and 44% chance of passing
in the Senate. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Blcast File (Feb. 19, 1998).
255. Hyde points out that the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act would not directly affect
these statutes as it only pertains to federal law. HYDE, supra note 7, at 83; see also H.R. 1965,
105th Cong. § 2 (f)(6)(A) (1997) ("The term 'civil forfeiture statute' means any provision of
federal law providing for the forfeiture of property.") (emphasis added).
256. Between 1985 and 1990 the total value of forfeited cash and property represented a
growth in asset forfeitures of over 1,500%. United States v. Twelve Thousand, Three Hundred
Ninety Dollars ($12,390), 956 F.2d 801, 807 n.6 (8th Cir. 1991) (Beam, C.J., dissenting) (citing
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL FORFEITURE OF THE INSTRUMENTS & PRO-
CEEDS OF CRIME: THE PROGRAM IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1990)). For more in-depth discussion on the
monetary benefits gained through forfeiture for law enforcement, see Mary M. Cheh, Can Some-
thing This Easy, Quick, and Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the
Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 41-47 (1994).
257. Because the current law allows 90% of proceeds from drug-related forfeitures to be re-
turned to local law enforcement, they have a stake in them to the extent that forfeitures fund
their budget. Piety, supra note 13, at 975.
258. Id.
259. Hay, supra note 1, at 28.
THE ABSURDITY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
quick sale-in Houston, Texas, over 4,000 cars are confiscated a year,
and in New York City, over 10,000.260
The Bennis decision leaves co-owners of property like Tina Bennis
without much confidence in justice. By failing to reign in the states'
unbridled use of forfeiture, the door is left wide open for continued
abuse. Since most innocent owners are in the same economic boat as
Tina Bennis, fighting for the return of property is too costly to bother
with since, as the law stands, their chance of success is slim. 261 Addi-
tionally, because potential forfeiture is typically a one time, low-
probability occurrence for each owner, they have little incentive to
form or join lobbying groups to fight for reform.262 Evidence suggests
that Michigan has already capitalized on this open door. In 1992,
Michigan seized fifty-four homes, with an average value of $15,000,
and 807 automobiles, with an average value of $1,400, along with
some 8,000 other forfeitures.263
The Bennis ruling has stirred great fear in third-party creditors. 264
The American Bankers Association addressed the possible repercus-
sions society may face when dealing with lenders if banks are to be
held responsible as "innocent owners. '265 The Association predicts
that financial institutions will restrict the flow of credit or other bank-
ing transactions to individuals when there is even the slightest suspi-
cion of illegal activity, leading to a huge increase in credit costs for all
potential borrowers. 266 Additionally, the lenders' efforts to investi-
gate prospective borrowers could conflict with their efforts to comply
with antidiscrimination laws or subject them to defamation claims.267
Such creditor fears may also inspire consumer fears of privacy viola-
tions. Privacy rights are implicated by the notion that any attempt to
borrow capital will lead to much more than a standard review of each
applicant's background, business dealings, and lifestyle. When one ac-
tually considers all of the potential owners of any given property, the
implications of Bennis continue to spiral.
260. HYDE, supra note 7, at 42.
261. As pointed out by officials of the Michigan Association for the Preservation of Property,
the majority of people who suffer from civil asset forfeiture in that state are average Americans,
not rich criminals or even druglords. HYDE, supra note 7, at 32.
262. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 239, at 85.
263. HYDE, supra note 7, at 32.
264. Steve France, Lenders Ask Supreme Court to Shield Innocent Third Parties, LENDER LIA-
BILrrY NEWS, Sept. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lrplln File.
265. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Bankers Association, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S.






In an age where co-ownership is widespread, any statute that seeks
forfeiture should require an innocent owner defense. But to hope that
every state legislature will amend its statutes is unrealistic. There are
more than one hundred statutes in place on the federal and state
level.268 The Supreme Court has failed in its duty to meaningfully look
at this case and the implications of its decision. As one commentator
noted: "[T]he Court is sending mixed signals to the lower courts and
muddying the constitutional waters. '2 69 The Bennis decision can only
be called a good decision if its effect is to highlight for legislators the
urgent need for reform in this area.
The Bennis holding is the result of too much deference to the past
and unconvincing analogies that add confusion to this area of law.
Regardless of whether civil forfeiture as a practice is justifiable or not,
"[the Supreme] Court has never felt constrained to follow prece-
dent .... [and] throughout its history has freely exercised its power to
reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions. '270 It is unfortu-
nate that in this case the Court felt constrained by outdated precedent
to do just that. While the Court was reviewing cases from the 1800s to
find justification for its decision, perhaps it should have taken notice
of a leading Justice of that time, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if
the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since,
and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.2 71
268. Civil Asset Forfeiture: Hearings on H.R. 1916 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Gerald B. Lefcourt, President-Elect, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense
Lawyers).
269. Jochner, supra note 249, at 315.
270. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
271. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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